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Repp v. Webber,
858 F. SupP. 1292 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Ray Repp ("Repp"), a professional musician, commenced a copyright
infringement action against defendant Andrew Lloyd Webber ("Webber"), a
musical composer, alleging that Webber copied his song entitled "Till You."
Webber moved for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 56, contending that Repp could not refute evidence that Webber's song was
independently created. The United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York granted Webber's motion, holding that Repp had neither proven a
prima facie case of copying nor discredited Webber's evidence of independent
creation.
FAcTs
Repp is a professional musician who works primarily in the field of popular
liturgical music. Webber is the composer of several musical theater productions
as well as liturgical music. Repp composed a folk song entitled "Till You" which
was copyrighted in July 1978. The song was recorded on the album
"Benedicamus", which was advertised in a weekly Catholic newspaper, released
at three religious conventions in 1978, re-released in December of that year, and
distributed to Australia in 1981. The sheet music of "Till You" was sold in four
books and Repp's music was sold directly to retail stores. Additionally, Repp
stated that he performed the song at over two hundred concerts throughout the
United States, Canada, Korea, and Japan.
Webber composed "The Phantom of the Opera" in 1983 to exhibit the vocal
talents of actress/singer Sarah Brightman, who assisted Webber in the compo-
sition. In early 1984 Webber provided a tape containing the melody of the song
to English director Trevor Nunn. In July 1985, the song was performed at a pri-
vate musical festival in Syndmonton, England. A single was released in January
1986 and the song was registered with the United States Copyright Office in
1987.
Plaintiff Repp brought this action for copyright infringement alleging Webber
copied "Till You" in the melody of "The Phantom of the Opera". Webber moved
for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
The issue before the District Court was whether a reasonable jury could find
that Webber copied "Till You" in the composition of "The Phantom of the Op-
era." The court stated that in order to show a prima facie case of copying, a
plaintiff must show that the defendant "had access to the copyrighted work and
that substantial similarities exist between the original work and the infringing
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work."' However, the defendant could rebut this showing by establishing that his
work was independently created? If copying is established, the plaintiff must
still show that the copying constitutes an improper appropriation.3
The parties did not contest that Repp had a valid copyright in "Till You." The
court stated that generally summary judgment would be granted where the plain-
tiff clearly could not make out the elements of a copyright infringement claim.
Thus, Webber had to show that there was no evidence to support Repp's claim
that Webber had access to "Till You" and that the two musical works were sub-
stantially similar.
Initially, the court determined whether Webber had access to Repp's work.
The court defined access as "hearing or having a reasonable opportunity to hear
the plaintiff's work, in other words having the opportunity to copy."4 Access
must be a "reasonable possibility."5 Where the infringed work was widely dis-
tributed or the defendant may have gained access through a certain series of
events, the plaintiff has proven access.6
Repp claimed that access could be inferred from the fact that a recording of
his music was given to someone who also knew Webber and from the wide
distribution of "Till You." The court held that Repp had not demonstrated
Webber had access to the copyrighted work. There was insufficient evidence to
establish a connection between Velline and Webber to support a finding of ac-
cess on that basis. The court found that Repp's song had not been widely dis-
seminated to the general public during the time period pertinent to the issue.
Because Repp had no documentation of the number of copies of "Till You" dis-
tributed during the relevant time, the court found the evidence to be purely spec-
ulative. Moreover the court held that access was not established by the fact that
Webber also composed liturgical music.
The court next addressed the issue of substantial similarity between "Till
You" and "The Phantom of the Opera." Repp argued that copying could be
inferred and improper appropriation proved due to the striking similarities be-
tween the two compositions. The court stated that for similarities to yield such
an inference the plaintiff must show that the similarities which exist between the
works can only be due to copying, instead of alternative reasons.7 Both Repp
and Webber had experts testify as to the similarity of the pieces. Based upon this
testimony as well as its own aural examination, the court determined that the
similarities between the two songs were not of the nature to warrant a conclusion
of copying without access. Although the pieces possessed common notes, the
1. Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 139 (2d Cir. 1990).
2. Gund, Inc. v. Russ Berrie and Co., 701 F. Supp. 164, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
3. Laureyssens, 964 F.2d at 140.
4. Sylvestre v. Oswald, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7002 at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 1993) (quoting
Intersong-USA v. CBS, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 274, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)).
5. d.
6. Sylvestre, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7002 at *8.
7. Stratchborneo v. Arc Music Corp., 357 F. Supp. 1393, 1403 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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court noted that the style and tempo differed. Consequently, Repp had not made
out a prima facie case of copying.
Even though Repp had not established the elements of his claim, the court
went on to consider Webber's evidence of independent creation. Webber had
submitted declarations from himself and Sarah Brightman detailing the circum-
stances surrounding the creation of "The Phantom of the Opera." Repp, on the
other hand, argued that Webber's history of copying from other composers refut-
ed an assertion of independent creation. Since Repp had not indicated any previ-
ous determinations of copyright infringement, the court found that Repp had not
controverted this evidence. As a result the court held that Webber's evidence of
independent creation negated the instant claim.
CONCLUSION
Repp claimed that Webber infringed his copyright to the song "Till You" by
copying the melody in "The Phantom of the Opera." The United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York found that Repp had not proven
that Webber had access to the song during the relevant time period. Although
there was some similarity between the two pieces, the court held that it did not
justify a conclusion of copying. Furthermore, since Webber had produced uncon-
tradicted evidence of independent creation, the copyright infringement claim was
negated. Thus, the court decided that Repp could not prove the elements of his
claim and awarded summary judgment to Webber.
Sherry Vaughn
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